The Supreme Court/The Supreme Court.iso/pc/ascii/1992/92_9059/92_9059.zo

Text File | 1994-06-16 | 26.2 KB | 519 lines

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
--------
No. 92-9059
--------
JONATHAN DALE SIMMONS, PETITIONER v.
SOUTH CAROLINA
on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of
south carolina
[June 17, 1994]

  Justice Blackmun announced the judgment of the
Court and delivered an opinion in which Justice
Stevens, Justice Souter, and Justice Ginsburg join.
  This case presents the question whether the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was
violated by the refusal of a state trial court to instruct
the jury in the penalty phase of a capital trial that
under state law the defendant was ineligible for parole.
We hold that where the defendant's future dangerous-
ness is at issue, and state law prohibits the defendant's
release on parole, due process requires that the sentenc-
ing jury be informed that the defendant is parole
ineligible.

                            I

                            A
  In July 1990, petitioner beat to death an elderly
woman, Josie Lamb, in her home in Columbia, South
Carolina.  The week before petitioner's capital murder
trial was scheduled to begin, he pleaded guilty to first
degree burglary and two counts of criminal sexual
conduct in connection with two prior assaults on elderly
women.  Petitioner's guilty pleas resulted in convictions
for violent offenses, and those convictions rendered

petitioner ineligible for parole if convicted for any
subsequent violent-crime offense.  S.C. Code Ann.
24-21-640 (Supp. 1993).
  Prior to jury selection, the prosecution advised the
trial judge that the State -[o]bviously [was] going to ask
you to exclude any mention of parole throughout this
trial.-  App. 2.  Over defense counsel's objection, the
trial court granted the prosecution's motion for an order
barring the defense from asking any question during
voir dire regarding parole.  Under the court's order,
defense counsel was forbidden even to mention the
subject of parole, and expressly was prohibited from
questioning prospective jurors as to whether they
understood the meaning of a -life- sentence under South
Carolina law.  After a 3-day trial, petitioner was
convicted of the murder of Ms. Lamb.
  During the penalty phase, the defense brought forward
mitigating evidence tending to show that petitioner's
violent behavior reflected serious mental disorders that
stemmed from years of neglect and extreme sexual and
physical abuse petitioner endured as an adolescent.
While there was some disagreement among witnesses
regarding the extent to which petitioner's mental con-
dition properly could be deemed a -disorder,- witnesses
for both the defense and the prosecution agreed that
petitioner posed a continuing danger to elderly women.
  In its closing argument the prosecution argued that
petitioner's future dangerousness was a factor for the
jury to consider when fixing the appropriate punishment.
The question for the jury, said the prosecution, was
-what to do with [petitioner] now that he is in our
midst.-  Id., at 110.  The prosecution further urged that
a verdict for death would be -a response of society to
someone who is a threat.  Your verdict will be an act of
self-defense.-  Ibid.
  Petitioner sought to rebut the prosecution's generalized
argument of future dangerousness by presenting evi-
dence that, due to his unique psychological problems, his
dangerousness was limited to elderly women, and that
there was no reason to expect further acts of violence
once he was isolated in a prison setting.  In support of
his argument, petitioner introduced testimony from a
female medical assistant and from two supervising
officers at the Richland County jail where petitioner had
been held prior to trial.  All three testified that peti-
tioner had adapted well to prison life during his pretrial
confinement and had not behaved in a violent manner
toward any of the other inmates or staff.  Petitioner also
offered expert opinion testimony from Richard L. Boyle,
a clinical social worker and former correctional em-
ployee, who had reviewed and observed petitioner's
institutional adjustment.  Mr. Boyle expressed the view
that, based on petitioner's background and his current
functioning, petitioner would successfully adapt to prison
if he was sentenced to life imprisonment.
  Concerned that the jury might not understand that
-life imprisonment- did not carry with it the possibility
of parole in petitioner's case, defense counsel asked the
trial judge to clarify this point by defining the term -life
imprisonment- for the jury in accordance with S.C. Code
24-21-640 (Supp. 1993).  To buttress his request,
petitioner proffered, outside the presence of the jury,
evidence conclusively establishing his parole ineligibility.
On petitioner's behalf, attorneys for the South Carolina
Department of Corrections and the Department of
Probation, Parole and Pardons testified that any offender
in petitioner's position was in fact ineligible for parole
under South Carolina law.  The prosecution did not
challenge or question petitioner's parole ineligibility.
Instead, it sought to elicit admissions from the witnesses
that, notwithstanding petitioner's parole ineligibility,
petitioner might receive holiday furloughs or other forms
of early release.  Even this effort was unsuccessful,
however, as the cross-examination revealed that Depart-
ment of Corrections regulations prohibit petitioner's
release under early release programs such as work-
release or supervised furloughs, and that no convicted
murderer serving life without parole ever had been
furloughed or otherwise released for any reason.
  Petitioner then offered into evidence, without objection,
the results of a statewide public-opinion survey conducted
by the University of South Carolina's Institute for Public
Affairs.  The survey had been conducted a few days
before petitioner's trial, and showed that only 7.1
percent of all jury-eligible adults who were questioned
firmly believed that a inmate sentenced to life imprison-
ment in South Carolina actually would be required to
spend the rest of his life in prison.  See App. 152-154.
Almost half of those surveyed believed that a convicted
murderer might be paroled within 20 years; nearly
three-quarters thought that release certainly would occur
in less than 30 years.  Ibid.  More than 75 percent of
those surveyed indicated that if they were called upon
to make a capital-sentencing decision as jurors, the
amount of time the convicted murderer actually would
have to spend in prison would be an -extremely impor-
tant- or a -very important- factor in choosing between
life and death.  Id., at 155.
  Petitioner argued that, in view of the public's apparent
misunderstanding about the meaning of -life imprison-
ment- in South Carolina, there was a reasonable
likelihood that the jurors would vote for death simply
because they believed, mistakenly, that petitioner
eventually would be released on parole.
  The prosecution opposed the proposed instruction,
urging the court -not to allow . . . any argument by
state or defense about parole and not charge the jury on
anything concerning parole.-  Id., at 37.  Citing the
South Carolina Supreme Court's opinion in State v.
Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E. 2d 315 (1991), the trial
court refused petitioner's requested instruction.  Petitioner
then asked alternatively for the following instruction:
      -I charge you that these sentences mean what
they say.  That is, if you recommend that the
defendant Jonathan Simmons be sentenced to death,
he actually will be sentenced to death and executed.
If, on the other hand, you recommend that he be
sentenced to life imprisonment, he actually will be
sentenced to imprisonment in the state penitentiary
for the balance of his natural life.
      -In your deliberations, you are not to speculate
that these sentences mean anything other than what
I have just told you, for what I have told you is
exactly what will happen to the defendant, depend-
ing on what your sentencing decision is.-  App. 162.
The trial judge also refused to give this instruction, but
indicated that he might give a similar instruction if the
jury inquired about parole eligibility.
  After deliberating on petitioner's sentence for 90 min-
utes, the jury sent a note to the judge asking a single
question: -Does the imposition of a life sentence carry
with it the possibility of parole?-  Id., at 145.  Over
petitioner's objection, the trial judge gave the following
instruction:
-You are instructed not to consider parole or parole
eligibility in reaching your verdict.  Do not consider
parole or parole eligibility.  That is not a proper
issue for your consideration.  The terms life impris-
onment and death sentence are to be understood in
their plan [sic] and ordinary meaning.-  Id., at 146.
Twenty-five minutes after receiving this response from
the court, the jury returned to the courtroom with a
sentence of death.
  On appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court,
petitioner argued that the trial judge's refusal to provide
the jury accurate information regarding his parole
ineligibility violated the Eighth Amendment and the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The
South Carolina Supreme Court declined to reach the
merits of petitioner's challenges.  With one Justice
dissenting, it concluded that, regardless of whether a
trial court's refusal to inform a sentencing jury about a
defendant's parole ineligibility might be error under
some circumstances, the instruction given to petitioner's
jury -satisfie[d] in substance [petitioner's] request for a
charge on parole ineligibility,- and thus there was no
reason to consider whether denial of such an instruction
would be constitutional error in this case.  State v.
Simmons, ___ S.C. ___, ___, 427 S.E. 2d 175, 179 (1993).
We granted certiorari, __ U. S. __ (1993).

                           II
  The Due Process Clause does not allow the execution
of a person -on the basis of information which he had no
opportunity to deny or explain.-  Gardner v. Florida, 430
U. S., at 362.  In this case, the jury reasonably may
have believed that petitioner could be released on parole
if he were not executed.  To the extent this misunder-
standing pervaded the jury's deliberations, it had the
effect of creating a false choice between sentencing
petitioner to death and sentencing him to a limited
period of incarceration.  This grievous misperception was
encouraged by the trial court's refusal to provide the
jury with accurate information regarding petitioner's
parole ineligibility, and by the State's repeated sugges-
tion that petitioner would pose a future danger to
society if he were not executed.  Three times petitioner
asked to inform the jury that in fact he was ineligible
for parole under state law; three times his request was
denied.  The State thus succeeded in securing a death
sentence on the ground, at least in part, of petitioner's
future dangerousness, while at the same time concealing
from the sentencing jury the true meaning of its non-
capital sentencing alternative, namely, that life impris-
onment meant life without parole.  We think it is clear
that the State denied petitioner due process.

                            A
  This Court has approved the jury's consideration of
future dangerousness during the penalty phase of a
capital trial, recognizing that a defendant's future
dangerousness bears on all sentencing determinations
made in our criminal justice system.  See Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U. S. 262, 275 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(noting that -any sentencing authority must predict a
convicted person's probable future conduct when it
engages in the process of determining what punishment
to impose-); California v. Ramos, 463 U. S. 992, 1003, n.
17 (1983) (explaining that it is proper for a sentencing
jury in a capital case to consider -the defendant's
potential for reform and whether his probable future
behavior counsels against the desirability of his release
into society-).
  Although South Carolina statutes do not mandate
consideration of the defendant's future dangerousness in
capital sentencing, the State's evidence in aggravation is
not limited to evidence relating to statutory aggravating
circumstances.  See Barclay v. Florida, 463 U. S. 939,
948-951 (1983) (plurality opinion); California v. Ramos,
463 U. S., at 1008 (-Once the jury finds that the
defendant falls within the legislatively defined category
of persons eligible for the death penalty . . . the jury
then is free to consider a myriad of factors to determine
whether death is the appropriate punishment-).  Thus,
prosecutors in South Carolina, like those in other States
that impose the death penalty, frequently emphasize a
defendant's future dangerousness in their evidence and
argument at the sentencing phase; they urge the jury to
sentence the defendant to death so that he will not be
a danger to the public if released from prison.
Eisenberg & Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions
in Capital Cases, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 4 (1993).
  Arguments relating to a defendant's future dangerous-
ness ordinarily would be inappropriate at the guilt phase
of a trial, as the jury is not free to convict a defendant
simply because he poses a future danger; nor is a
defendant's future dangerousness likely relevant to the
question whether each element of an alleged offense has
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  But where the
jury has sentencing responsibilities in a capital trial,
many issues that are irrelevant to the guilt-innocence
determination step into the foreground and require
consideration at the sentencing phase.  The defendant's
character, prior criminal history, mental capacity,
background, and age are just a few of the many factors,
in addition to future dangerousness, that a jury may
consider in fixing appropriate punishment.  See Lockett
v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455
U. S. 104, 110 (1982); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U. S., at
948-951.
  In assessing future dangerousness, the actual duration
of the defendant's prison sentence is indisputably
relevant.  Holding all other factors constant, it is
entirely reasonable for a sentencing jury to view a
defendant who is eligible for parole as a greater threat
to society than a defendant who is not.  Indeed, there
may be no greater assurance of a defendant's future
nondangerousness to the public than the fact that he
never will be released on parole.  The trial court's
refusal to apprise the jury of information so crucial to
its sentencing determination, particularly when the
prosecution alluded to the defendant's future dangerous-
ness in its argument to the jury, cannot be reconciled
with our well-established precedents interpreting the
Due Process Clause.

                            B
  In Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U. S. 1 (1986), this
Court held that a defendant was denied due process by
the refusal of the state trial court to admit evidence of
the defendant's good behavior in prison in the penalty
phase of his capital trial.  Although the majority opinion
stressed that the defendant's good behavior in prison
was -relevant evidence in mitigation of punishment,- and
thus admissible under the Eighth Amendment, id., at 4,
citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586, 604 (1978) (plural-
ity opinion), the Skipper opinion expressly noted that the
Court's conclusion also was compelled by the Due
Process Clause.  The Court explained that where the
prosecution relies on a prediction of future dangerous-
ness in requesting the death penalty, elemental due
process principles operate to require admission of the
defendant's relevant evidence in rebuttal.  476 U. S., at
5, n. 1.  See also id., at 9 (Powell, J., opinion concurring
in judgment) (-[B]ecause petitioner was not allowed to
rebut evidence and argument used against him,- the
defendant clearly was denied due process).
  The Court reached a similar conclusion in Gardner v.
Florida, 430 U. S. 349 (1977).  In that case, a defendant
was sentenced to death on the basis of a presentence
report which was not made available to him and which
he therefore could not rebut.  A plurality of the Court
explained that sending a man to his death -on the basis
of information which he had no opportunity to deny or
explain- violated fundamental notions of due process.
Id., at 362.  The principle announced in Gardner was
reaffirmed in Skipper, and it compels our decision today.
See also Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 683, 690 (1986)
(due process entitles a defendant to -`a meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense'-) (citation
omitted); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U. S. 68, 83-87 (1985)
(where the State presents psychiatric evidence of a
defendant's future dangerousness at a capital sentencing
proceeding, due process entitles an indigent defendant to
the assistance of a psychiatrist for the development of
his defense).
  Like the defendants in Skipper and Gardner, peti-
tioner was prevented from rebutting information that the
sentencing authority considered, and upon which it may
have relied, in imposing the sentence of death.  The
State raised the specter of petitioner's future dangerous-
ness generally, but then thwarted all efforts by peti-
tioner to demonstrate that, contrary to the prosecutor's
intimations, he never would be released on parole and
thus, in his view, would not pose a future danger to
society.  The logic and effectiveness of petitioner's
argument naturally depended on the fact that he was
legally ineligible for parole and thus would remain in
prison if afforded a life sentence.  Petitioner's efforts to
focus the jury's attention on the question whether, in
prison, he would be a future danger were futile, as he
repeatedly was denied any opportunity to inform the
jury that he never would be released on parole.  The
jury was left to speculate about petitioner's parole
eligibility when evaluating petitioner's future dangerous-
ness, and was denied a straight answer about peti-
tioner's parole eligibility even when it was requested.

                            C
  The State and its amici contend that petitioner was
not entitled to an instruction informing the jury that
petitioner is ineligible for parole because such informa-
tion is inherently misleading.  Essentially, they argue
that because future exigencies such as legislative reform,
commutation, clemency, and escape might allow peti-
tioner to be released into society, petitioner was not
entitled to inform the jury that he is parole ineligible.
Insofar as this argument is targeted at the specific
wording of the instruction petitioner requested, the
argument is misplaced.  Petitioner's requested instruc-
tion (-If . . . you recommend that [the defendant] be
sentenced to life imprisonment, he actually will be
sentenced to imprisonment in the state penitentiary for
the balance of his natural life,- App. 162) was proposed
only after the trial court ruled that South Carolina law
prohibited a plain-language instruction that petitioner
was ineligible for parole under state law.  To the extent
that the State opposes even a simple parole-ineligibility
instruction because of hypothetical future developments,
the argument has little force.  Respondent admits that
an instruction informing the jury that petitioner is ineli-
gible for parole is legally accurate.  Certainly, such an
instruction is more accurate than no instruction at all,
which leaves the jury to speculate whether -life impris-
onment- means life without parole or something else.
  The State's asserted accuracy concerns are further
undermined by the fact that a large majority of States
which provide for life imprisonment without parole as an
alternative to capital punishment inform the sentencing
authority of the defendant's parole ineligibility.  The
few States that do not provide capital-sentencing juries
with any information regarding parole ineligibility seem
to rely, as South Carolina does here, on the proposition
that California v. Ramos, 463 U. S. 992 (1983), held
that such determinations are purely matters of state
law.
  It is true that Ramos stands for the broad proposition
that we generally will defer to a State's determination
as to what a jury should and should not be told about
sentencing.  In a State in which parole is available, how
the jury's knowledge of parole availability will affect the
decision whether or not to impose the death penalty is
speculative, and we shall not lightly second-guess a
decision whether or not to inform a jury of information
regarding parole.  States reasonably may conclude that
truthful information regarding the availability of commu-
tation, pardon, and the like, should be kept from the
jury in order to provide -greater protection in [the
States'] criminal justice system than the Federal Consti-
tution requires.-  Id., at 1014.  Concomitantly, nothing
in the Constitution prohibits the prosecution from
arguing any truthful information relating to parole or
other forms of early release.
  But if the State rests its case for imposing the death
penalty at least in part on the premise that the defend-
ant will be dangerous in the future, the fact that the
alternative sentence to death is life without parole will
necessarily undercut the State's argument regarding the
threat the defendant poses to society.  Because truthful
information of parole ineligibility allows the defendant
to -deny or explain- the showing of future dangerous-
ness, due process plainly requires that he be allowed to
bring it to the jury's attention by way of argument by
defense counsel or an instruction from the court.  See
Gardner, 430 U. S., at 362.

                           III
  There remains to be considered whether the South
Carolina Supreme Court was correct in concluding that
the trial court -satisfie[d] in substance [petitioner's]
request for a charge on parole ineligibility,- 427 S.E. 2d,
at 179, when it responded to the jury's query by stating
that life imprisonment was to be understood in its -plain
and ordinary meaning.-  Ibid.  In the court's view,
petitioner basically received the parole-ineligibility
instruction he requested.  We disagree.
  It can hardly be questioned that most juries lack
accurate information about the precise meaning of -life
imprisonment- as defined by the States.  For much of
our country's history, parole was a mainstay of state and
federal sentencing regimes, and every term (whether a
term of life or a term of years) in practice was under-
stood to be shorter than the stated term.  See generally
Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining
the Effectiveness of Determinate Sentencing Reform, 81
Calif. L. Rev. 61 (1993) (describing the development of
mandatory sentencing laws).  Increasingly, legislatures
have enacted mandatory sentencing laws with severe
penalty provisions, yet the precise contours of these
penal laws vary from State to State.  See Cheatwood,
The Life-Without-Parole Sanction: Its Current Status
and a Research Agenda, 34 Crime & Delinq. 43, 45, 48
(1988).  Justice Chandler of the South Carolina Supreme
Court observed that it is impossible to ignore -the
reality, known to the `reasonable juror,' that, historically,
life-term defendants have been eligible for parole.-  State
v. Smith, 298 S.C. 482, 489-490, 381 S.E. 2d 724, 728
(1989) (opinion concurring and dissenting), cert. denied,
494 U. S. 1060 (1990).
  An instruction directing juries that life imprisonment
should be understood in its -plain and ordinary- mean-
ing does nothing to dispel the misunderstanding reason-
able jurors may have about the way in which any
particular State defines -life imprisonment.-  See
Boyde v. California, 494 U. S. 370, 380 (1990) (where
there is a -reasonable likelihood that the jury has
applied the challenged instruction in a way that pre-
vents the consideration of constitutionally relevant
evidence,- the defendant is denied due process).
  It is true, as the State points out, that the trial court
admonished the jury that -you are instructed not to
consider parole- and that parole -is not a proper issue
for your consideration.-  App. 146.  Far from ensuring
that the jury was not misled, however, this instruction
actually suggested that parole was available but that the
jury, for some unstated reason, should be blind to this
fact.  Undoubtedly, the instruction was confusing and
frustrating to the jury, given the arguments by both the
prosecution and the defense relating to petitioner's
future dangerousness, and the obvious relevance of
petitioner's parole ineligibility to the jury's formidable
sentencing task.  While juries ordinarily are presumed
to follow the court's instructions, see Greer v. Miller, 483
U. S. 756, 766, n. 7 (1987), we have recognized that in
some circumstances -the risk that the jury will not, or
cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the conse-
quences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the
practical and human limitations of the jury system
cannot be ignored.-  Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S.
123, 135 (1968).  See also Beck v. Alabama, 447 U. S.
625, 642 (1980); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U. S., at 950
(-Any sentencing decision calls for the exercise of
judgment.  It is neither possible nor desirable for a person
to whom the State entrusts an important judgment to
decide in a vacuum, as if he had no experiences-).
  But even if the trial court's instruction successfully
prevented the jury from considering parole, petitioner's
due process rights still were not honored.  Because
petitioner's future dangerousness was at issue, he was
entitled to inform the jury of his parole ineligibility.  An
instruction directing the jury not to consider the defend-
ant's likely conduct in prison would not have satisfied
due process in Skipper, supra, and, for the same rea-
sons, the instruction issued by the trial court in this
case does not satisfy due process.


                           IV
  The State may not create a false dilemma by advanc-
ing generalized arguments regarding the defendant's
future dangerousness while, at the same time, prevent-
ing the jury from learning that the defendant never will
be released on parole.  The judgment of the South
Carolina Supreme Court accordingly is reversed and the
case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion.
                                      It is so ordered.